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BRUCE BUCHAN AND DAVID ELLISON 
GRIFFITH UNIVERSITY 
 	  In	   an	   obscure	   footnote	   to	   his	   entrepreneurial	   proposal	   for	   a	   multipurpose	  institution	   tellingly	   labelled	   the	   Panopticon,	   Jeremy	   Bentham	   wrote	   his	  epigrammatic	   injunction	   to	   the	   modern	   age:	   ‘lose	   no	   occasion	   of	   speaking	   to	   the	  eye’.1	  The	  phrase	  was	  deliberately	  declaratory,	  and	  it	  contained	  an	  inherent	  sensory	  hierarchy.	   Power	  was	   to	   be	   registered	   through	   the	   eye,	   by	   seeing	   and	   by	  making	  visible.	   Aural	   sensation,	   by	   speaking,	   was	   referred	   to	   only	  metaphorically.	   In	   this	  paradigm,	   the	   sound	   of	   power	   was	   subordinate	   to	   the	   power	   of	   vision.	   If	   Lord	  Chancellor	  Bacon’s	   legal	  maxim	  was	   ‘Nihil	   ex	   scenâ’	   (nothing	   outside	   of	   the	   public	  eye),	   Bentham	   asserted	   his	   must	   be	   ‘Multum	   ex	   scenâ’	   (everything	   outside	   of	   the	  public	  eye).2	  	  This	   hierarchy	   was	   implicit	   in	   Bentham’s	   purpose	   to	   recommend	   that	   in	   the	  operations	  of	  the	  law	  and	  the	  punishment	  of	  offenders	  (with	  which	  he	  was	  primarily	  concerned	   in	   recommending	   the	   Panopticon),	   theatre	   was	   everything.	   The	   awful	  majesty	  of	  the	  law	  as	  well	  as	  the	  abject	  guilt	  of	  the	  offender	  must	  be	  seen,	  and	  it	  was	  by	  seeing	  along	  carefully	  constructed	  but	  otherwise	  invisible	  lines	  of	  sight	  built	  into	  the	   institution	   that	   the	   Panopticon	   itself	   would	   function.	   The	   Panopticon	   would	  manifest	  law	  and	  justice,	  morality	  and	  order	  in	  carefully	  designated	  fields	  of	  vision.	  
Bruce Buchan and David Ellison—Introduction	   5 
The	  knowledge	  of	  being	  held	   in	   sight,	   that	  one	  was	  observed	  or	  observable	  at	  any	  moment,	   was	   Bentham’s	   alternative	   to	   the	   inefficiency	   of	   ‘torture’	   and	   cruelty	   by	  whips	  and	  chains	  in	  the	  existing	  prisons	  he	  wanted	  to	  replace.	  Held	  in	  sight	  within	  the	   walls	   of	   their	   cells,	   but	   otherwise	   unrestrained	   by	   torturing	   chains,	   Bentham	  suggested	   that	   ‘noise’	  was	   the	   ‘only	   offence’	   to	  which	   ‘troublesome’	   inmates	   could	  resort,	  an	  offence	  that	  could	  easily	  be	  ‘subdued	  by	  gagging’.3	  In	   its	   inscription	   of	   vision	   into	   the	   design	   of	   the	   institution,	   a	   design	  transferrable	  to	  other	  uses	  including	  hospitals	  and	  factories,	  Bentham’s	  Panopticon	  has	  famously	  been	  read	  as	  the	  incarnation	  of	  visual	  power,	  through	  surveillance,	  in	  modern	  societies.4	  More	  recent	  critics	  have	  suggested	  that	  the	  disciplinary	  power	  of	  surveillance	  (of	   the	  many	  by	   the	   few)	  has	  been	  replaced	  by	   the	  no-­‐less	  disciplined	  and	  disciplinary	  orchestration	  of	  spectacle	  (the	  exposure	  of	  the	  few	  to	  the	  many).5	  In	  terms	  of	  either	  surveillance	  or	  spectacle,	  modernity	  has	  been	  portrayed	  as	  an	  age	  of	  vision	  par	   excellence,	   in	  which	   both	   power	   and	   possibility	   are	   primarily	   conveyed	  visually.	  This	   interpretation	  has	  been	   consolidated	  by	  a	  body	  of	  work	   in	  historical	  sensory	  studies	  which	  has	  tended	  to	  concentrate	  on	  vision	  over	  sound	  and	  the	  other	  senses,	  emphasising	  the	  importance	  of	  spectatorship	  in	  the	  expression	  of	  civility	  and	  politeness.6	   The	   behavioural	   emblem	   of	   this	   body	   of	   work	   remains	   Adam	   Smith’s	  tying	   of	   civil	   conduct	   to	   the	   ability	   to	   take	   the	   position	   of	   a	   ‘cool	   and	   impartial	  spectator’	   in	   his	  Theory	   of	   Moral	   Sentiments.7	   In	   Smith’s	   view,	   the	   approbation	   of	  social	  passions	  and	  disapprobation	  of	  unsociable,	  disruptive	  passions	  depended	  on	  our	   ability	   to	   see	   ourselves	   as	   an	   ‘indifferent	   by-­‐stander’	   judging	   the	   conduct	   of	  others	   before	   us,	   and	   thus	   internalising	   indifferent	   judgement	   by	   spectating	   upon	  our	  own	  conduct.8	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  impartial	  spectator	  occupied	  a	  position	  akin	  to	  the	  inmate	  in	  Bentham’s	  Panopticon.	  By	  internalising	  the	  experience	  of	  being	  gazed	  at,	   both	   were	   forever	   gazed	   upon	   by	   themselves.	   Here	   the	   force	   of	   morality	   was	  explicitly	  tied	  to	  the	  power	  of	  vision:	  	  The	  man	  who	  has	  broke	  through	  all	  those	  measures	  of	  conduct,	  which	  can	  alone	  render	  him	  agreeable	   to	  mankind,	   though	  he	  should	  have	   the	  most	  perfect	  assurance	  that	  what	  he	  had	  done	  was	  for	  ever	  to	  be	  concealed	  from	  every	  human	  eye,	  it	  is	  all	  to	  no	  purpose.	  When	  he	  looks	  back	  upon	  it,	  and	  views	  it	  in	  the	  light	  in	  which	  the	  impartial	  spectator	  would	  view	  it,	  he	  finds	  that	  he	  can	  enter	  into	  none	  of	  the	  motives	  which	  influenced	  it.9	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Indeed,	   Smith	   explicitly	   contrasted	   the	   powerful	   silence	   of	   internalised	  impartial	  spectatorship	  to	  the	  mere	  ‘noise’	  of	  external	  sources	  of	  moral	  judgement:	  if	   the	   man	   within	   condemns	   us,	   the	   loudest	   acclamations	   of	   mankind	  appear	  but	  as	   the	  noise	  of	   ignorance	  and	   folly,	  and	  whenever	  we	  assume	  the	   character	   of	   this	   impartial	   judge,	   we	   cannot	   avoid	   viewing	   our	   own	  actions	  with	   his	   distaste	   and	  dissatisfaction.	   The	  weak,	   the	   vain,	   and	   the	  frivolous,	   indeed,	   may	   be	   mortified	   by	   the	   most	   groundless	   censure,	   or	  elated	  by	   the	  most	  absurd	  applause.	  Such	  persons	  are	  not	  accustomed	  to	  consult	  the	  judge	  within	  concerning	  the	  opinion	  which	  they	  ought	  to	  form	  of	  their	  own	  conduct.10	  The	  project	  to	  return	  sound	  to	  critical	  consciousness	  seeks	  to	  redress	  the	  apparent	  overvaluation	   of	   the	   visual	   in	   accounts	   of	   the	   emergence	   of	   Modernity.	   The	  coherence	  and	  persuasiveness	  of	  these	  accounts	  rest	  unsustainably,	  so	  the	  argument	  goes,	  on	  a	  general	  impoverishment	  of	  the	  other	  senses,	  notably	  the	  acoustic.	  We	  are	  asked	  to	  incredulously	  observe	  the	  relative	  silence	  of	  Western	  history,	  and	  return	  to	  the	  archive	  with	  ears	  newly	  opened	  to	  the	  past	  and	  present.	  This	  general	  invitation	  to	   attend	   to	   a	   host	   of	  muted,	   ignored	   or	   suppressed	   sounds	   has	   been	   taken	   up	   in	  work	   appearing	   in	   the	   fields	   of	   cultural	   theory,	   literary	   and	   film	   studies,	   cultural	  history,	   and	   the	   anthropology	   of	   the	   senses.	   To	   offer	   but	   one	   example,	   Murray	  Schafer’s	  groundbreaking	  The	  Soundscape	  called	  for	  just	  such	  an	  acknowledgment	  of	  the	   sonic	   dimension	   of	   history	   while	   also	   reflecting	   on	   the	   ear’s	   particular	  vulnerability	  to	  the	  welter	  of	  noises	  that	  threaten	  to	  overwhelm	  at	  every	  turn.11	   In	  this	  regard,	  Schafer	  is	  party	  to	  a	  much	  older	  tradition	  of	  the	  sonically	  beleaguered;	  those	  who	  wish	   to	   both	   recover	   and	   advocate	   for	   a	   contemplative	   relationship	   to	  sound	  in	  the	  face	  of	  apparently	  indiscriminate	  and	  impinging	  noise.	  The	  long	  history	  of	  similarly	  afflicted	  writers	  suggests	  a	  promising	  point	  of	  entry	  for	  thinking	  about	  what	   noise	   might	   mean	   for	   those	   who	   make	   it,	   hear	   it,	   harness	   its	   metaphorical	  energies	   or	   are	   tasked	   with	   its	   management.	   Early	   entries	   in	   what	   must	   now	   be	  recognised	   as	   a	   distinct	   genre	   of	   principally	   urban	   complaint	   include	   works	   by	  Dickens,	  Babbage,	  James	  Sully	  and	  Schopenhauer.	  Schopenhauer’s	   essay,	   ‘On	   Noise’,	   draws	   a	   stark	   dividing	   line	   between	   those	  who	   are	   sensitive	   to	   noise	   and	   those	   who	   are	   not.	   The	   former	   find	   themselves	  subjected	  to	  a	  host	  of	   interruptions	  that,	   in	  turn,	  wreak	  havoc	  on	  their	  capacity	  for	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roomy,	  synthesising	  thought.	  In	  the	  face	  of	  interminable	  noise,	  the	  mind	  loses	  both	  value	   (like	   a	   large	   diamond	   cut	   into	   smaller	   pieces),	   and	   power	   (like	   an	   army	  dissolving	  under	  the	  scattering	  of	   troops).12	  Noise,	  which	   is	  of	  course	  a	  necessarily	  fluid	   and	   partial	   term,	   assumes	   a	   destructive	   solidity	   among	   those	   who	   suffer	   its	  effects.	   In	   Peter	   Bailey’s	   useful	   summary	   it	   is	   ‘a	   broad	   yet	   imprecise	   category	   of	  sounds	   that	   register	   variously	   as	   excessive,	   incoherent,	   confused,	   inarticulate	   or	  degenerate’.13	  Noise	  is	  a	  vexatious	  fault	   line	  between	  nuisance	  and	  purpose,	   labour	  and	  rest,	  pleasure	  and	  pain.	  Schopenhauer’s	  complaint,	  which	  predictably	  rounds	  on	  the	   injuries	   those	  who	  work	  with	  their	  hands	   inflict	  on	  those	  who	  work	  with	  their	  heads,	   captures	  something	  of	   the	  complex,	  overdetermined	  nature	  of	  noise	  and	   its	  reception.	   Noise	   distinguishes	   between	   the	   classes	   while	   also	   opening	   an	  imaginative	  pathway	  into	  the	  supposedly	  coarser	  sensorium	  of	  the	  labourer,	  which	  may	   be	   intimately	   documented	   without	   the	   corresponding	   demand	   of	   political	  sympathy.	  Which	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  noise-­‐afflicted	  never	  cease	  to	  speculate	  on	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  noise-­‐makers,	  and	  their	  rooted	  indifference—or	  worse—their	  positive	  pleasure	  in	   the	   face	   of	   din.	   In	   his	   1878	   essay	   ‘Civilisation	   and	   Noise’	   (the	   terms	   are	  diametrically	   opposed)	   the	   Victorian	   psychologist	   James	   Sully	   considered	   the	  density	  of	  urban	  life	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  variable	  sensitivity	  to	  noise:	  The	   man	   with	   a	   finely	   set,	   musical	   ear	   has	   practically	   to	   live	   with	  barbarians	  who	  actually	   take	  pleasure	   in	  harsh	  and	  unlovely	  sounds,	  and	  with	  many	  more	   semi-­‐civilised	  who	   are	   quite	   indifferent	   to	   such	   noises.	  Not	  only	   children	  but	   adults	   love	   to	   tease	   and	  excite	   their	  dogs,	   and	   this	  seems	   to	   show	   that	   they	   positively	   enjoy	   the	   sensations	   of	   loud	   sound	  which	   they	   thus	   evoke.	   The	   fondness	   of	   a	   certain	   class	   of	   people	   for	  screaming	  birds	  points	  to	  the	  same	  primitive	  conditions	  of	  sensibility.14	  	  Noise	   not	   only	   differentiates	   between	   peoples,	   but	   the	   act	   of	   registering	   its	  supposedly	  destructive	  presence	  serves	  as	  a	  sensitive	  index	  to	  the	  decline	  of	  rights	  as	   yet	   unnamed	   and	  without	   recourse	   to	   legal	   enforcement.	   Before	   the	   advent	   of	  noise	  ordinance	  laws	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  these	  socially	  aggrieved	  authors	  had	  few	   options	   but	   to	   suffer,	   and	   document,	   in	   terms	   that	   variously	   described	   their	  vulnerability	  to	  the	  city,	  the	  national	  temperament,	  even	  the	  sound	  of	  the	  historical	  moment.	   Hostilities	   over	   the	   composition	   of	   the	   urban	   soundscape	   continue	   to	  influence	  the	  way	  we	  think	  about	  noise	  in	  an	  adversarial	  light,	  but	  there	  are	  parallel	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developments	  in	  the	  history	  of	  sound	  where	  noise—particularly	  in	  its	  convivial	  and	  exuberant	   forms—could	   be	   taken	   as	   a	   sign	   of	   civility,	   urbanity,	   creativity,	   even	  sublimity.	   Although	   here	   too	   the	   semiotic	   instability	   of	   noise	  makes	   it	   difficult	   to	  contrast	  punitive,	  disciplinary	  approaches	  to	  excess	  sound	  against	  more	  liberal	  and	  supportive	  regimes.	  This	  confounding	  quality	  of	  noise,	  its	  pervasive	  troubling	  of	  the	  apparent	   purity	   of	   its	   diametrically	   opposed	   alternatives—silence,	   music,	   polite	  discourse,	   and	   so	   on—invites	   a	  more	   thorough	   consideration	   of	   its	   various	   forms,	  values	   and	   histories.	   The	   essays	   that	   make	   up	   this	   special	   section	   address	   noise	  through	  a	  series	  of	  case	  studies	  ranging	  from	  Socratic	  dialogue	  to	  unmuffled	  engines	  in	  full	  roar.	  Marie	  Thomson	   argues	   for	   a	  more	   generous	   explanation	   of	   noise	   that	   evades	  the	  narrower	  dictates	  of	  an	  aesthetic	  moralism	  that	  privileges	  silence	  over	  din.	  Noise	  need	  not	  be	  heard	  as	  necessarily	  destructive;	  a	  model	  that	  relies	  on	  the	  stability	  of	  both	   an	   emitting	   source	   and	   a	   pained	   receiver.	   Instead,	   Thompson	   conceives	   of	  noise	   as	   an	   interruption	   to	   a	   set	   of	   relationships	   that	   induces	   a	   modification	   in	  bodies	  and	  systems.	  As	  such,	  noise	  has	  an	  intimate	  connection	  to	  affect	  in	  that	  it	  has	  no	  point	  of	  origin	  and	  sits	  outside	  of	  the	  symbolic.	  Affect	  does	  not	  cleave	  to	  an	  object	  or	  subject;	  it	  is	  rather	  a	  transitional	  movement	  between	  states.	  Thinking	  of	  noise	  in	  these	   terms	   releases	   us	   from	   conventional	   policing	   responses	   that	   focus	   on	   the	  identification	  and	  containment	  of	  the	  noise-­‐source.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  that	  conceiving	  of	  noise	  as,	  in	  Thompson’s	  neat	  formulation,	  an	  affect	  with	  effects,	  removes	  the	  human	  ear	  as	  the	  privileged	  site	  of	  reception,	  identification	  and	  judgment	  of	  noise.	  In	  lieu	  of	  judgment,	  Thompson	  imagines	  a	  radical	  openness	  to	  noise’s	  potential.	  	  Bruce	  Buchan’s	   essay	   is	   similarly	   open	   to	   a	   positive	   valuation	   of	   noise	   in	   the	  context	  of	  recovering	  an	  acoustic	  dimension	  in	  the	  history	  of	  political	  thought.	  The	  public	  communication	  of	  political	  ideas	  in	  monological	  tirade	  or	  in	  crowded	  protest	  is	  an	  inherently	  noisy	  activity,	  but	  Buchan	  argues	  for	  a	  wider	  receptivity	  to	  noise.	  By	  speaking	  of	  noise	  he	  questions	  the	  normative	  privileging	  of	  the	  sound	  of	  dialogue	  in	  Western	   political	   thought.	   Dialogue	   is	   typically	   represented	   as	   an	   archetypal	  political	   sound	   in	   which	   what	   is	   heard	   are	   the	   varied	   meanings	   conveyed	   in	   the	  measured	  public	  exchange	  of	  arguments,	  thought	  by	  some	  to	  constitute	  the	  essence	  of	  democracy.	  Buchan	  argues	   that	  political	  noise	  should	  be	   listened	   to	  as	  well,	  not	  only	  in	  the	  grammar	  and	  syntax	  of	  words	  and	  sentences,	  but	  in	  the	  varied	  contexts	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in	   which	   speech,	   protest,	   oratory,	   instruction	   or	   interjection	   are	   performed.	  Crucially,	   it	   is	   in	   the	   imaginative	   invocation	   of	   the	   noises	   of	   these	   contexts	   that	  meaning	  is	  inscribed	  in	  written	  texts	  through	  the	  legitimation	  of	  particular	  kinds	  of	  speech	  and	  speakers.	  Where	   Buchan	   surveys	   political	   noise	   across	   centuries	   of	   Western	   history,	  Vanessa	  Agnew,	  Peter	  Denney,	  Helen	  Groth	  and	  David	  Ellison	  bring	  a	  more	  detailed	  focus	   to	   selected	   soundscapes	   of	   eighteenth-­‐	   and	   nineteenth-­‐century	   Europe.	  Vanessa	   Agnew	   reconsiders	   the	   grand	   tour	   as	   a	   sonic	   experience	   through	   the	  specific,	  but	  also	  characteristically	   representative,	   figure	  of	  Goethe.	  Agnew	  attends	  to	  the	  sociable	  conversations	  on	  the	  road,	  the	  explicitly	  sought	  auditory	  experiences	  and	   the	   insistent	   and	   continuous	   presence	   of	  music	   by	  way	   of	   demonstrating	   the	  centrality	   of	   sound	   to	   the	   tour.	   Using	   a	   sustained	   focus	   on	   the	  messy,	   sometimes	  contradictory	  accounts	  offered	  by	  Goethe’s	   Italian	   Journey,	   among	  other	   first-­‐hand	  testimony,	  Agnew	  explores	  what	  it	  meant	  to	  listen	  in	  the	  eighteenth	  century.	  Peter	  Denney	  also	  attends	  to	  the	  sociable	  noise	  of	  conversation,	  music	  and	  song	  but	   here	   as	   it	   defined	   the	   soundscape	   of	   English	   rural	   life	   in	   the	   first	   half	   of	   the	  eighteenth	  century.	  For	  poets,	  these	  exuberant	  sounds	  lent	  themselves	  to	  the	  task	  of	  expressing	   the	   fertility	   of	   the	   land,	   the	   joy	   of	   the	   harvest	   and,	   cumulatively,	   the	  greatness	   of	   Britain	   itself.	   By	   the	   century’s	   end	   the	   now	   enclosed	   and	   improved	  fields	   had	   fallen	   silent,	   shifting	   the	   terms	   by	   which	   the	   landscape	   could	   be	  apprehended	   from	   the	   acoustic	   to	   the	   visual.	   As	   Denney	   explains,	   these	   hushed	  fields	  emerged	  from	  a	  newly	  individualised	  and	  proprietorial	  approach	  to	  land	  that	  valued	  the	  visible	  appearance	  of	  order.	  In	  this	  context	  the	  silent	  landscape	  not	  only	  provided	  an	  emphatic	  contrast	   to	   the	  clamour	  of	   the	   industrial	   city,	  but	  was	  made	  available	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  civilisation.	  The	  focus	  then	  shifts	  towards	  the	  early	  Australian	  colonies	   and	   an	   exploration	   of	   how	   the	   moral	   and	   aesthetic	   values	   attributed	   to	  English	  agricultural	  fields,	  first	  as	  sociable	  soundscapes	  and	  then	  as	  silenced	  parks,	  authorised	  the	  colonists	  to	  exercise	  authority	  over	  Indigenous	  lands.	  	  Helen	  Groth	  takes	  up	  the	  question	  of	  this	  distinction	  between	  noise	  and	  order	  in	  her	  account	  of	  the	  complex	  and	  productive	  imbrication	  of	  photography	  and	  text-­‐based	  voice	   transcription	   technologies	   in	   the	  work	  of	  Henry	  Mayhew.	  Drawing	  on	  the	  work	  of	  the	  influential	  Victorian	  psychologist	  James	  Sully,	  Groth	  aligns	  Mayhew’s	  commitment	  to	  the	  mimetic	  capture	  of	  London	  street	  voices	  with	  what	  she	  calls	  ‘the	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emerging	   discursive	   nexus’	   between	   noise	   and	   civilisation.	   The	   silence	   of	   print	  simultaneously	  impedes,	  but	  also	  invites,	  access	  to	  an	  uncivil	  soundscape	  seemingly	  captured	   by	   the	   promise	   of	   transcription.	   Here	   Groth	   traces	   the	   rise	   of	   ‘a	  distinctively	  modern	   take	  on	   the	  struggle	   to	  hear	  what	  can	  no	   longer	  be	  heard’.	   In	  the	  documentary	  impulse	  revealed	  in	  Mayhew’s	  alignment	  of	  text	  and	  image	  as	  the	  desire	  to	  fix	  a	  moment	  in	  time,	  Groth	  detects	  a	  new	  impulse,	  a	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  the	   voice	   not	   as	   irretrievable,	   but	   as	   peculiarly	   susceptible	   to	   the	  materialities	   of	  new	  media.	  	  David	  Ellison	  also	  considers	  emergent	  forms	  of	  sonic	  technology	  in	  his	  account	  of	   incidental	   machine	   noise	   in	   eighteenth-­‐	   and	   nineteenth-­‐century	   automata.	  Contemporary	   audiences	   for	   automata	   performance	   demonstrated	   a	   capacity	   to	  filter	  or	  neutralise	  extraneous	  noise	  that	  otherwise	  threatened	  to	  interfere	  with	  the	  narrative	   content	   of	   the	   demonstration.	   These	   audiences	   suggest	   affinities	   with	  those	   gathered	   at	   musical	   concerts,	   which	   similarly	   learned	   to	   suppress	   the	  unavoidable	   noise	   associated	   with	   performance.	   Ellison	   charts	   the	   way	   that	  automata	   noise	   came	   to	   signify	  etherealised	   human	   machine	   interaction,	   thus	  offering	  an	  alternative	  to	  conventional	  renderings	  of	   industrial	   labour.	  He	  suggests	  that	   recovering	   the	   reception	   contexts	   of	   automata	   sound	   offers	   insights	   into	   the	  development	  of	  white	  noise	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	  modern	  corporate	  productivity.	  The	   final	   group	   of	   essays	   highlights	   the	   continuing	   relevance	   of	   normative	  judgments	   about	   noise	   and	   silence	   as	   important	   legal	   and	   cultural	   phenomena.	  Katherine	  Biber	  explores	  the	  legal	  right	  to	  silence	  framed	  by	  the	  considerable	  noise	  provoked	  by	  a	  defendant’s	  refusal	  to	  speak.	  Her	  article	  attends	  to	  the	  profound	  gap	  between	  legal	  responses	  to	  silence,	  and	  the	  status	  of	  silence	  in	  literature,	  linguistics	  and	  philosophy.	  Under	  the	  rules	  of	  evidence,	  for	  example,	  what	  may	  not	  be	  inferred	  from	   silent	   testimony	   is	   made	   explicit,	   whereas	   conversationally	   a	   silent	  interlocutor	  provokes	  wide-­‐ranging	  and	  intense	  speculation.	  Biber	  reads	  legal	  cases	  with	  an	  ear	  to	  the	  noise	  produced	  by	  the	  defendant	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  crime,	  and	  in	  the	   period	   leading	   up	   to	   their	   appearance	   in	   court—a	   period	   under	   which	   the	  defendant’s	   intermittent	  silence	  was	  treated	  inferentially.	   It	   is	  only	  on	  entering	  the	  court	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  silence	  is	  dramatically	  constricted,	  as	  juries	  are	  instructed	  what	   they	   may	   and	   may	   not	   understand	   by	   the	   absence	   of	   speech.	   Biber	   argues	  ‘Law’s	   commentary	   forecloses	   the	   possibility	   that	   silence	   might	   be	   deliberately	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ambiguous,	  that	  it	  might	  invite	  speculation,	  or	  that	  inferences	  demand	  to	  be	  drawn	  from	  it’.	  In	   their	   jointly	  authored	  article,	  Alexandra	  Brown	  and	  Andrew	  Leach	  seize	  on	  Italian	   historian	   Manfredo	   Tafuri’s	   metaphorical	   distinction	   between	   silence	   and	  noise.	  Tafuri	  has	   two	  contrasting	   tendencies	   in	   Italian	  architecture	   in	  mind:	  one	   is	  open	  and	  integrative,	  the	  other	  introspective	  and	  concerned	  with	  autonomy.	  Brown	  and	  Leach	  assign	  the	  works	  of	  selected	  architects	  under	  these	  headings,	   less	   in	  the	  spirit	  of	  taxonomy	  than	  to	  consider	  how	  these	  critical	  concepts	  might	  give	  shape	  to	  the	  trajectory	  of	  architecture	  since	  the	  1970s.	  	  Finally,	   Melissa	   Bull	   considers	   Australian	   legislative	   responses	   to	   the	  phenomenon	   of	   ‘hooning’	   since	   the	   1990s.	   She	   traces	   the	   origins	   and	   effects	   of	   a	  framework	  of	  laws	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  jurisdictions	  that	  locate	  the	  ‘hoon’	  as	  a	  noisy	  and	  criminal	   disturber	   of	   public	   peace	   in	   their	   penchant	   for	   ‘souped-­‐up’	   cars,	   revving	  engines,	  loud	  music	  and	  street	  racing.	  Yet	  the	  punitive	  responses	  to	  this	  noisy	  crime	  are	   out	   of	   proportion	   to	   its	   actual	   danger	   to	   public	   safety.	   The	   disproportionate	  response,	   she	   argues,	   belies	   a	   neoliberal	   acoustic	   politics	   focused	   on	   securing	  sequestered	  urban	  spaces	  and	  quietening	  unregulated	  noises	  within	  them.	  In	   drawing	   together	   this	   selection	   of	   essays	   from	   across	   the	   humanities	   and	  social	  sciences,	  this	  special	  section	  of	  Cultural	  Studies	  Review	  attests	  to	  the	  historical	  and	   contemporary	   contingency	   of	   ‘noise’	   as	   a	   phenomenon	   that	   (almost	   literally)	  cries	  out	  for	  further	  investigation.	  While	  noise	  and	  sound	  have	  regularly	  been	  paired	  as	  opposite	  normative	  and	  aesthetic	  poles	  on	  the	  sonic	  spectrum,	  the	  essays	  in	  this	  issue	  each	  point	   toward	   the	  need	   for	  a	  more	  complicated	  appraisal	  of	   this	  pairing.	  The	  normative	  or	  aesthetic	  privileging	  of	  sound	  (in	  speech	  or	   in	  music)	  prevents	  a	  more	   positive	   evaluation	   of	   noise	   as	   a	   phenomenon	   worthy	   of	   further	   historical	  investigation,	   or	   as	   a	   marker	   of	   human	   ingenuity	   and	   industry	   or	   as	   the	   means	  through	  which	  restricted	  speech	  is	  opened	  to	  genuinely	  public	  participation.	  In	  each	  of	  these	  ways,	  the	  essays	  in	  this	  collection	  use	  noise	  as	  an	  object	  of	  investigation	  that	  cuts	   across	   otherwise	   neatly	   defined	   domains	   of	   law,	   politics,	   architecture	   and	  literature.	  In	  pushing	  the	  boundaries	  of	  their	  own	  disciplinary	  fields	  in	  this	  way,	  this	  collection	   also	   serves	   as	   a	   timely	   reminder	   of	   the	   value	   and	   the	   viability	   of	  interdisciplinary	  research	  in	  Australia.	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